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Abstract: 
In recent years, there has been a rapid rise in commercial knowledge transfers from universities 
to practitioners or university/industry technology transfer (UITT), via licensing agreements, 
research joint ventures, and startups. In a previous study in 1999, the authors outlined a 
production function model to assess the relative efficiency of UITT and conducted field research 
to identify several organizational factors that could enhance the effectiveness of university 
management of intellectual property portfolios. This paper extends this framework and evaluates 
the impact of organizational incentives on the effectiveness of UITT. It is found that universities 
having more attractive incentive structures for UITT, i.e. those that allocate a higher %age of 
royalty payments to faculty members, tend to be more efficient in technology transfer activities. 
University administrators who wish to foster UITT should be mindful of the importance of 
financial incentives. 
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organizational incentives | finance | commercial knowledge transfer  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a rapid rise in commercial knowledge transfers from universities 
to practitioners or university/industry technology transfer (UITT), via such mechanisms as 
licensing agreements, research joint ventures, and university-based startups. Since university 
management of intellectual property portfolios is a relatively new phenomenon at most academic 
institutions, there is considerable uncertainty among administrators regarding optimal 
organizational practices within the technology transfer infrastructure. The end result is all 
research universities are searching for ways to maximize the efficiency of UITT, that is the 
private financial returns that accrue to the university from these commercialization activities. 
The ability of universities to effectively manage intellectual property portfolios also has 
important policy implications, since governmental officials increasingly view university 
technology transfer as a mechanism for stimulating regional growth and development.1 That is, 
UITT activities may also generate significant social returns, i.e. local technological spillovers 
that benefit firms and consumers in the vicinity of the university, or others who benefit from the 
new products and processes that arise from more rapid technological diffusion. 
Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence that would serve to guide university 
administrators who manage the UITT process. The purpose of this study is to fill this gap, based 
on quantitative and qualitative, field-based evidence. Measures of relative productivity are 
constructed from benchmarking surveys conducted by the Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM), which contain information on UITT inputs and outputs. We complement our 
econometric analysis with insights from field interviews at five research universities in two 
regions of the USA. Essentially, we use the qualitative work to specify the arguments of the 
production function and determinants of the deviation from the efficiency frontier. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our qualitative, field-
based research, which enabled specification of the UITT production function and identification 
of some of the organizational factors that may explain some of the variation in UITT 
performance across universities. Section 3 outlines the econometric framework that is used to 
assess and explain variations in relative UITT productivity. Section 4 describes the data and 
empirical results. Conclusions and suggestions for additional research are presented in the final 
section. 
2. Qualitative evidence relating to UITT productivity 
In order to improve our understanding of the UITT production process, we conducted extensive 
field interviews, which are described in great detail in Siegel et al. (2003). An inductive approach 
was employed during this exercise, since it was not clear from the literature how one would 
specify a UITT production function or which institutional and organizational factors are most 
relevant, in terms of explaining why some universities outperform others. 
The qualitative data consist of information collected during structured, in-person interviews of 
directors of university technology transfer offices (TTOs) and other university technology 
administrators (e.g. Vice-provost for Research), entrepreneurs and managers whose firms have 
transferred technologies, and academic scientists at five major (classified by the Carnegie 
Foundation as ‘Research-One’) research universities in the Southwest and Southeast USA.2 
Table 1 presents some information on the five universities that were examined. This set includes 
private and public universities, land grant institutions, and universities with and without a 
medical school. There is also considerable variation with respect to size and age of the TTO, and 
extent of licensing activity. The bottom panel of Table 1 presents a comparison of mean values 
of key variables (average annual number of licensing agreements, licensing revenue, TTO staff 
and age) for the five institutions visited, and for 113 universities whose administrators completed 
a comprehensive UITT survey conducted by the Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM). Although the five institutions generate below average licensing revenue, 
they are quite similar to the average AUTM respondent along the other dimensions. These 
findings lend credence to our assertion that the universities in our field study are representative 
institutions, with respect to UITT. 
Table 1 Characteristics of the five universities in the qualitative study and comparison of mean 
values of key variables with full statistical sample of 113 universities (1991–1998) 
  
University 
A 
University 
B 
University 
C 
University 
D 
University 
E 
Organizational 
status 
Private Public Public Public Public 
Medical School Yes Yes No No Yes 
Land Grant 
Institution 
No No Yes No Yes 
TTO established in 1984 1985 1982 1985 1988 
STAFF 14.2 11.5 11.1 2.9 8.5 
LICENSE1 28.1 19.0 26.1 3.4 12.0 
LICENSE2 1213.2 773.3 1535.7 382.7 177.0 
Source: Association of University Technology Managers (1999). 
 
 
Table 1 Characteristics of the five universities in the qualitative study and comparison of mean 
values of key variables with full statistical sample of 113 universities (1991–1998) 
Mean values of key variables (1991–1998) 
Variable 
name Description 
Five universities in 
field study 
113 universities in 
statistical sample 
LICENSE1 Average annual licensing 
agreements 
17.7 16.1 
LICENSE2 Average annual licensing revenue 
($000) 
816.4 1937.5 
STAFF Average annual TTO employees 9.6 9.4 
AGE Numbers of years since TTO was 
established (as of 1996) 
11.1 13.2 
 
At each university, we interviewed academic scientists, TTO directors, and top-level research 
administrators. Within the surrounding region, we also met with entrepreneurs, directors of 
business development, intellectual property managers and other research executives of large 
companies, and executives of patent management firms and non-profit organizations with an 
interest in UITT. All in all, we conducted 55 interviews: 20 managers and entrepreneurs, 15 
administrators (including the 5 TTO directors), and 20 scientists. During these 55 face-to-face 
meetings, 98 individuals were interviewed, since multiple respondents were present during a 
number of meetings. 
In order to derive some broad conclusions from the information provided by our interviewees, 
we conducted a quantitative analysis of the qualitative data, based on methods outlined in Miles 
and Huberman (1994). This involved carefully reading each transcript and identifying specific 
themes that emerged from responses to open-ended questions regarding UITT. Comments 
relating to a particular theme were then coded, which enabled us to generate a set of frequency 
tables, containing percentages of respondents who identified a particular theme relating to their 
perceptions regarding outputs and barriers to effective UITT. Such percentages were then 
computed separately for each type of respondent (i.e. university administrators, 
managers/entrepreneurs, and academic scientists). Some of the inferences we make in the 
remainder of this paper regarding institutional and organizational factors are based on these 
figures.3 
2.1 Inputs and outputs 
With respect to the specification of the UITT production function, there were three key stylized 
facts derived from the field research. The first is that although faculty members working on a 
federal research grant are required to disclose inventions to the university technology transfer 
office (TTO), some researchers do not follow this practice and the rule is rarely enforced by their 
university. This aberrant behaviour on the part of faculty members and lack of monitoring on the 
part of administrators highlights the importance of the labour input of TTO staff in simply 
eliciting disclosures and thus, increasing the potential pool of potential technologies for 
licensing. 
Our field research also revealed that the importance of patents in this process is often overstated. 
Specifically, we discovered that many firms license technologies long before the university 
patents them, if they are patented at all. This early licensing occurs for several reasons. First, 
patent protection may not be viable or critical for a particular type of technology. For instance, 
patents are not important in the computer software industry or in the design of integrated circuits. 
Second, firms may have considerable faith in the scientist's ability or reputation, or because the 
inventor has a longstanding financial relationship with the firm.4 Finally, some firms (especially 
younger, more entrepreneurial companies) are anxious to lock-in promising embryonic 
technologies at a low price. These findings imply that a critical input in this process is invention 
disclosures, which constitute the pool of available technologies for licensing. 
A third key stylized fact culled from our interviews relates to the importance of (external) 
intellectual property (IP) lawyers in UITT. Some institutions use IP lawyers to help them obtain 
copyrights and in various aspects of patenting and licensing, especially in support of prosecution, 
maintenance, litigation, and interference. Indeed, it is quite common for universities to devote 
substantial resources to the maintenance and re-negotiation of licensing agreements due to the 
embryonic nature (e.g. uncertainty) of the technologies and to the fledgling nature of many of the 
firms that license university-based technologies. 
In sum, our qualitative research leads us to conjecture that the following are ‘inputs’ to UITT: 
1. Invention disclosures (a proxy for the set of available technologies for licensing). 
2. Labour employed by the TTO. 
3. Legal fees (external) incurred to protect the university's intellectual property.5 
Discussions with university administrators—the ‘producers’ in our model—were also helpful in 
determining the relevant set of outputs. These officials perceive that licensing activity is by far 
the most critical output, although they disagree as to whether revenue or some measure of the 
flow of licensing deals (e.g. average annual number of licensing agreements) is more important. 
Specifically, we found that 87% of the administrators viewed licensing revenue as their relevant 
output; while 67% mentioned the number of licensing transactions. Given these qualitative 
findings, we use licensing revenue and the number of licensing agreements consummated as our 
proxies for output in the UITT production function. 
2.2 Environmental factors 
Relative efficiency in UITT is also likely to be related to environmental factors, such as the 
presence of a medical school on campus. A recent study reports that over 60% of MIT's 
university licenses result from a biomedical invention.6 Other environmental variables might 
include measures of regional economic growth and R&D activity of local companies, which 
allow us to control, albeit imperfectly, for financial and technological factors that influence the 
ability of firms to sponsor R&D at the university and the existence of technological 
agglomeration externalities. Numerous authors report evidence of such spillover effects. Jaffe et 
al. (1993) report that patents generated within the same state and SMSA are more likely to be 
cited by firms in the same state or SMSA. Audretsch and Stephan (1996) analyse interactions 
between academic scientists and local firms and conclude that such linkages play an important 
role in promoting innovation in biotechnology. 
2.3 Institutional and organizational factors 
Our qualitative analysis was initiated on the proposition that managerial practices in UITT may 
be important in explaining variation in relative performance, since this activity is fertile ground 
for potential organizational conflict. We conjecture that such discord is likely to arise because 
academic scientists, university administrators, corporate managers, and entrepreneurs have 
heterogeneous goals and objectives, which they pursue from the perspective of different 
organizational cultures. For instance, academics are primarily motivated by recognition within 
the scientific community, which requires that they quickly disseminate knowledge in published 
form. This form of disclosure conflicts with goal of firms and entrepreneurs to maintain 
proprietary control over knowledge in order to maximize the financial return on investment in 
knowledge. 
The bureaucratic culture of the university is similarly at odds with the organizational culture of 
most entrepreneurial firms, which value timeliness, speed, and flexibility. Reflecting these 
cultural values, numerous managers stressed the importance of time to market and concomitant 
first mover advantages as critical success factors of UITT. On the contrary, university 
administrators (working through the TTO) typically have little incentive to dramatically 
accelerate the commercialization process. Not surprisingly, they were focused on following all 
the appropriate rules and procedures, in case they are accused of ‘giving away’ lucrative 
university-based technologies.7 
The field research revealed that the most critical barriers to effective UITT are those related to 
informational and cultural barriers between universities and firms, the responsiveness of 
universities to the needs of firms and entrepreneurs, and reward systems for faculty involvement 
in UITT. Although it is difficult to construct precise measures of these factors, we hypothesize 
that three variables may serve as useful proxies, which we describe in the remainder of this 
section. 
Our field evidence implies that there may be a learning effect, with respect to formal university 
management of intellectual property. If organizational learning occurs, universities with more 
experience in formal management of UITT may be more efficient than comparable universities 
with less experience. Thus, we also construct a measure of the age of the TTO (AGE). 
The interviews revealed that organizational incentives for UITT might also be relevant. Two 
factors are likely to affect the propensity of faculty members to become involved in UITT. The 
first is the department and university's promotion and tenure (P&T) policies, which typically do 
not reward such activity. Indeed, some academics asserted that such activity was penalized in 
P&T, based on an opportunity cost argument. A second factor that is hypothesized to influence 
faculty involvement in UITT relates to pecuniary rewards. This is the university's royalty and 
equity distribution formula, which determines the percentage of the licensing royalty (or equity) 
that is allocated to faculty members who transfer technologies. 
Unfortunately, we do not have any systematic measures across universities of the level of 
receptiveness to UITT activity in P&T policies. However, we were able to collect information on 
royalty percentages at numerous universities. The most common distribution formula is to divide 
royalties equally between the academic inventor, the inventor's department, and the rest of the 
university. Thus, we constructed a variable ROYALTY, which denotes the percentage of 
licensing royalties (or equity) allocated to faculty members at a given institution.8 As noted in 
Friedman and Silberman (2003), there is considerable variation in the inventor's share of 
licensing royalties, ranging from a low of 22.8% at Arizona State University to a high of 88.8% 
at Carnegie Mellon. The corresponding numbers at MIT, Stanford, and Columbia (three 
universities that generate substantial UITT) are 27.1%, 27.1%, and 50.0%, respectively. 
We also conjecture that organizational structure may be relevant, in terms of making universities 
more responsive to the needs of firms who commercialize university-based technologies. There 
appear to be two basic models for managing licensing offices: a centralized or decentralized 
structure. For instance, MIT and Stanford have a single licensing office for the entire university. 
A more extreme form of centralization is when there is one licensing office for all the public 
universities within a state (e.g. the State University of New York (SUNY)). Some public 
universities have established centralized foundations to manage licensing, such as the Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), which holds the most valuable stem cell research patent. 
Bercovitz et al. 2001) provide an excellent example of decentralized licensing. They note that 
Johns Hopkins has separate licensing offices for its medical school, Applied Physics Laboratory, 
and the remainder of the university. Another form of decentralization involves universities 
outsourcing the licensing function. One of the organizations we visited, Research Corporation 
Technologies, based in Tucson, Arizona, has managed technology transfer licensing for several 
universities, including Michigan State. 
 
3. Measurement and analysis of relative productivity 
Our framework for constructing measures of relative productivity is stochastic frontier 
estimation, which was developed independently by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van 
den Broeck (1977). This method generates a production (or cost) frontier with a stochastic error 
term that consists of two components: a conventional random error and a term that represents 
deviations from the frontier, or relative inefficiency. 
3. Measurement and analysis of relative productivity 
Our framework for constructing measures of relative productivity is stochastic frontier 
estimation, which was developed independently by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van 
den Broeck (1977). This method generates a production (or cost) frontier with a stochastic error 
term that consists of two components: a conventional random error and a term that represents 
deviations from the frontier, or relative inefficiency. 
Assume that the production function can be characterized as 
yi = Xiβ + _i 
where the subscript i refers to the ith university, y represents licensing output, X denotes a vector 
of inputs, β is the unknown parameter vector, and _ is an error term that consists of two 
components, i = (Vi − Ui), where Ui is a non-negative error term representing technical 
inefficiency, or failure to produce maximal output given the set of inputs used, and Vi is a 
symmetric error term that accounts for random effects. Thus, we can rewrite equation (1) as 
yi = Xiβ + Vi − Ui  
Consistent with Aigner et al. (1977), we assume that the Ui and Vi have the following 
distributions: 
 
That is, the inefficiency term Ui is assumed to have a half-normal distribution; i.e. universities 
are either ‘on the frontier’ or below it.9 Jondrow et al. (1982) specify a functional form for the 
conditional distribution of [Ui/(Vi − Ui)], the mean (or mode) of which provides a point estimate 
of Ui . 
An important parameter in stochastic frontier models is , the ratio of the 
standard error of technical inefficiency to the standard error of statistical noise, which is bounded 
between 0 and 1. Note that γ = 0 under the null hypothesis of an absence of inefficiency, which 
would imply that all of the variance in the observed error term can be attributed to statistical 
noise. 
An important extension of the stochastic frontier literature (Pitt and Lee, 1981) has been the 
ability to incorporate determinants of technical inefficiency into these models. This extension is 
crucial to our analysis, since a chief goal of our study is to ‘explain’ deviations from the frontier 
(i.e. relative inefficiency in UITT). Consistent with Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Reifschneider 
and Stevenson (1991) we conjecture that the Ui are independently distributed as truncations at 
zero of the N(mi, σ2 u ) distribution with 
mi = Ziθ 
where Z is a vector of environmental, institutional, and organizational variables that are 
hypothesized to influence relative efficiency and θ is a parameter vector.10  
As shown in Battese and Coelli (1995), simultaneous estimation of the production frontier and 
inefficiency equations (equations (1a) and (2)) by maximum likelihood methods generates 
estimates of the parameter vectors β and δ, which we can use to compute estimates of relative 
productivity. The authors also note that this method is preferable to a two-stage approach, which 
involves computing estimates of relative productivity and then running OLS regressions on a set 
of determinants of establishment-level relative inefficiency. The problem with the two-stage 
approach is that it yields inconsistent estimates, since the inefficiency effects in the first stage of 
the model are assumed to i.i.d., while in the second stage they are hypothesized to be a function 
of university-specific factors. 
Two critical issues arise in the context of production function estimation. The first is whether to 
employ non-parametric methods (e.g. data envelopment analysis (DEA)) or parametric  
estimation procedures, such as the stochastic frontier method.11We have already resolved this 
issue in favour of the stochastic frontier approach, given our interest in conducting hypothesis 
tests relating to the production function parameters (e.g. estimating returns to scale) and the 
determinants of relative productivity (e.g. assessing the relative importance of institutional and 
organizational factors). 
A second issue, given our choice to employ a parametric approach, relates to the choice of a  
functional form for the production function.We choose a flexible functional form, the translog, 
which imposes fewer restrictions on elasticities of substitution than the Cobb–Douglas 
specification. 
This can be specified as follows  
 
where y and X again denote the technology transfer output and a vector of K technology transfer 
inputs, respectively, and i refers to the ith university. As before, we can append an error term, i 
= Vi − Ui , to equation (4) and simultaneously estimate an equation representing the determinants 
of relative inefficiency (Ui). 
In the following section, we present the characteristics of our data and the econometric results. 
4. Data and Empirical Results 
Based on our previous discussion, we hypothesize the following three-factor, log-linear translog 
production function, where a measure of licensing activity is presumed to be a function of three 
inputs: invention disclosures, TTO staff, and legal expenditures: 
ln(LICENSEi) = β0 + β1 ln(INVDISCi) + β2 ln(STAFFi) + β3 ln(LEGALi) 
+ γ11(ln(INVDISCi))2 + γ22(ln(STAFFi))2 + γ33(ln(LEGALi))2 
+ γ12 ln(INVDISCi) ln(STAFFi) + γ23 ln(STAFFi) ln(LEGALi) 
+ γ31 ln(LEGALi) ln(INVDISCi) + Vi − UI  
where: LICENSE = average annual licensing agreements or revenue; 
INVDISC = average annual invention disclosures; 
STAFF = average annual TTO employees; 
LEGAL = average annual external legal expenditures. 
The technical inefficiency Ui term is expressed as 
 
where ENV, INST, and ORG are vectors of environmental, institutional, and organizational 
variables, respectively. Consistent with our discussion in the previous section regarding various 
proxies for these factors, the equation for Ui that we actually estimate is 
Ui = θ0 + θMMEDi + θRDINDRDij + θQINDOUTij + θA1AGEi + θA2(AGEi)2 
+ θA3(AGEi)3 + θRROYALTYij + θSSTRUCTURE + μI 
where MED is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the university has a medical school; 0 
otherwise, INDRD and INDOUT are average annual industry R&D intensity and average annual 
real output growth in the university’s state ( j ), respectively, AGE is the age of the TTO,  
ROYALTY is the percentage of the royalty (or equity) that is allocated to faculty members who 
transfer technologies, STRUCTURE is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the university has 
centralized  licensing; 0 otherwise categorical variable describing how the university organizes 
its licensing activities, and μ is a classical disturbance term. 
n the empirical analysis, two sets of (single output) production function estimates will be 
presented: one based on the average annual number of licensing agreements and another based 
on average annual licensing revenue. Our primary data source is a comprehensive survey 
conducted by AUTM, which was completed by TTO directors at 113 academic institutions for 
1991–1998.12 The AUTM file contains annual data on the number of licensing agreements 
(LICENSE1), royalty income generated by licenses (LICENSE2), university startups generated 
(STARTUPS), invention disclosures (INVDISC), number of full-time-equivalent employees in 
the TTO (STAFF), and (external) legal expenditures on UITT (LEGAL). Our data sources for 
state-level industrial R&D (INDRD) and real output growth (INDOUT) are NSF and the BEA.13 
A difficulty with two of the output measures (LICENSE1 and STARTUPS) is that they are count 
variables. For instance, licensing agreements vary substantially in their significance, which 
implies that it may be misleading to draw inferences about aggregate technology flows based on 
the number of deals.14 That is another reason why we consider licensing revenue as an 
additional measure of output, since it does not suffer from this problem. 
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the inputs and outputs of the licensing 
production functions are presented in Table 2. The representative university in our sample 
consummates 16 licensing agreements per year, earns $1.9 million in licensing income, receives 
56 invention disclosures, employs nine workers in the TTO, and spends $361,200 on external 
legal fees to protect its intellectual property. The correlation coefficients generally have the 
expected signs and magnitudes (e.g. invention disclosures are strongly positively correlated with 
the number of licensing agreements and revenue). 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and a matrix of correlation coefficients for the inputs and outputs of the stochastic 
frontier production function (equation (3)) 
Variable 
name Description 
  
Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
LICENSE1 Average annual licensing agreements   16.1 9 22.1 
LICENSE2 Average annual licensing revenue ($000)   1937.57 370 5101.3 
INVDISC Average annual invention disclosures   56.1 25 67.2 
STAFF Average annual TTO employees   9.4 5 16.3 
LEGAL Average annual external legal expenditures on UITT 
(000) 
  361.2 132.1 641.5 
N=113 universities, 1991–1998. 
Source: AUTM (1999). 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and a matrix of correlation coefficients for the inputs and outputs of the stochastic 
frontier production function (equation (3)) 
  LICENSE1 LICENSE2 INVDISC STAFF LEGAL 
LICENSE1 1.00 0.88 0.64 0.49 −0.35 
LICENSE2 0.88 1.00 0.67 −0.05 0.59 
INVDISC 0.64 0.67 1.00 0.46 0.45 
STAFF 0.49 −0.05 0.46 1.00 0.50 
LEGAL −0.35 0.59 0.45 0.50 1.00 
 
Note that each variable is computed as an annual average over the sample period. Although it 
may desirable econometrically to construct a panel consisting of annual observations, this 
approach is problematic for two reasons. First, the use of annual data or lagged values to estimate 
the production function would result in an unbalanced panel, since all universities are not 
continuous reporters during the sample period. A related concern is that it is desirable to have a 
large sample of establishments when fitting the production function, given that the precision of 
this estimation will be highly dependent on the number of establishments used to project the 
frontier. Computing annual averages over the sample period yields the largest possible number of 
universities for the econometric estimation. 
Table 3 contains two sets of parameter estimates of the stochastic frontier production function 
and inefficiency models outlined in the previous section (equations (5) and (7)) for two 
dependent variables: average annual number of licensing agreements and average annual 
licensing revenues, respectively.15 We used the FRONTIER statistical package (see Coelli, 
1994) to generate these estimates. Columns (1) and (3) present maximum-likelihood estimates of 
without environmental, institutional, and organizational variables, while columns (2) and (4) 
present the coefficients of the stochastic frontier model including environmental, institutional, 
and organizational factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Maximum likelihood parameter estimates of stochastic frontier translog production functions and determinants of relative inefficiency (equations (5) and (7)) 
  Dependent variable               
  Average annual number of licensing agreements 
Average annual licensing 
revenue 
            
Production function parameters (1) (2) (3) (4)         
β0 −0.256* (0.102) −0.273** (0.134) 1.887* (0.803) 1.397** (0.692) 
β1 0.652* (0.104) 0.637* (0.145) 1.245* (0.452) 1.347* (0.613) 
β2 0.467* (0.093) 0.392* (0.130) −0.183 (0.297) −0.184 (0.288) 
β3 −0.057** (0.029) −0.051** (0.025) 0.395* (0.138) 0.407* (0.178) 
γ11 −0.010** (0.004) −0.009** (0.004) −0.014 (0.012) −0.010 (0.006) 
γ22 −0.007 (0.005) −0.010** (0.004) 0.009 (0.011) −0.012** (0.006) 
γ33 −0.005 (0.008) −0.011** (0.005) −0.010** (0.004) −0.005 (0.004) 
γ12 0.113** (0.052) 0.065 (0.050) 0.085* (0.038) 0.053 (0.046) 
Table 3 Maximum likelihood parameter estimates of stochastic frontier translog production functions and determinants of relative inefficiency (equations (5) and (7)) 
  Dependent variable               
  Average annual number of licensing agreements 
Average annual licensing 
revenue 
            
Production function parameters (1) (2) (3) (4)         
γ23 −0.008 (0.010) −0.008 (0.006) −0.006 (0.008) −0.006 (0.005) 
γ31 0.101* (0.004) 0.007** (0.003) 0.007 (0.008) 0.008 (0.011) 
Determinants of relative 
inefficiency 
                
MED     −0.032 (0.068)     −0.006 (0.099) 
INDRD     −0.084** (0. 
041) 
    −0.108** (0.051) 
INDOUT     0.007 (0.010)     −0.006 (0.020) 
AGE     −0.070* (0.032)     −0.076** (0.037) 
(AGE) 2     −0.051 (0.062)     0.064 (0.105) 
(AGE) 3     0.093 (0.103)     −0.009 (0.012) 
Table 3 Maximum likelihood parameter estimates of stochastic frontier translog production functions and determinants of relative inefficiency (equations (5) and (7)) 
  Dependent variable               
  Average annual number of licensing agreements 
Average annual licensing 
revenue 
            
Production function parameters (1) (2) (3) (4)         
ROYALTY     −0.145** (0.071)     −0.153** (0.075) 
STRUCTURE     0.038 (0.054)     −0.024 (0.042) 
−log L 23.12   28.56   24.57   30.15   
 
0.793* (0.198) 0.694* (0.292) 0.809* (0.326) 0.751* (0.283) 
Mean technical                 
  efficiency 0.78   0.87   0.79   0.89   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, N=113 universities. 
*Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level. 
 
We focus first on estimates of the production function parameters, which appear to be relatively 
stable, regardless of whether we include the determinants of relative inefficiency (columns (2) 
and (4)). Note that in all four variants of the model, β1, the elasticity of licensing output with 
respect to invention disclosures is estimated to be positive and highly statistically significant. In 
contrast, with respect to β2, we find that hiring additional staff in the TTO generates more 
agreements (columns (1) and (2)), but not additional revenue (columns (3) and (4)). Finally, our 
empirical estimates of β3 suggest that additional spending on outside lawyers (to negotiate 
licensing agreements) reduces the number of licensing agreements, but increases licensing 
revenue. This finding is consistent with our field research, where firms reported that it was much 
more difficult to negotiate with outside attorneys than university administrators. These same 
respondents reported that they would sometimes abandon negotiations with a school if they felt 
the lawyers were too aggressive in exercising its intellectual property rights. Each of these 
empirical results is consistent with those reported in our earlier study (Siegel et al., 2003), based 
on older data and a simpler econometric framework. 
Next, we turn to the results regarding the determinants of relative inefficiency, based on the 
parameter estimates of equation (7), which appear in columns (2) and (4). It appears that an 
increase in industrial R&D within the same state as the university will enhance its licensing 
productivity (i.e. move that university closer to the ‘frontier’). The negative and significant 
coefficient on AGE implies that there may be organizational learning in UITT. It appears that our 
proxy for organizational incentives for UITT, ROYALTY, has the strongest impact on relative 
performance. That is, institutions that want to enhance UITT productivity should increase the 
share of licensing royalty payments allocated to faculty members. On the other hand, the 
insignificance of the coefficient on STRUCTURE is inconsistent with our hypothesis that 
decentralized technology transfer offices generate higher levels of performance. 
Although several coefficients in Table 3 are insignificant, the γ values are highly statistically 
significant. This indicates that the null hypothesis that inefficiency effects are absent from the 
model can be decisively rejected in both equations. Further evidence that external factors 
generate considerable explanatory power is presented on the bottom of Table 3, which contrasts 
the mean technical efficiency in versions of the model excluding (columns (1) and (3)) and 
including (columns (2) and (4)) the environmental, institutional, and organizational variables. 
The latter set of findings indicates that these factors explain some of the variation in technical 
inefficiency across universities, 40.9% and 47.6%, respectively.16 
5. Conclusions 
Our findings imply that organizational incentives are an important factor in explaining why some 
universities outperform comparable institutions in transferring technologies, at least when 
licensing activity is considered to be the relevant ‘output’ of UITT. Recall that our empirical 
analysis focused exclusively on one dimension of the financial incentives for faculty members to 
engage in UITT. This result is consistent with the theoretical model presented in Beath et al. 
2000), which suggests that faculty members respond to pecuniary incentives in deciding how to 
allocate effort to technology transfer activities. Universities that seek to enhance licensing should 
allocate a higher share of the royalties to faculty members. Stated alternatively, university 
administrators should view faculty as economic agents who respond to incentives. Changing 
incentives will change behavior. 
It would be useful to extend our empirical analysis in three ways. First, we note that while 
faculty members are the key ‘suppliers’ in the production function model, incentives for 
university administrators may also be critical. That is, we also need to consider the importance of 
financial incentives for technology transfer officers, or those who manage the process of UITT. 
In this regard, it would be useful to examine whether universities where technology transfer 
officers receive some form of incentive compensation tend to be closer to the efficiency frontier. 
A second extension would be to explore the role of non-pecuniary incentives, especially those 
relating to promotion and tenure policies at universities. These factors are clearly important 
determinants on the propensity of faculty members to engage in these activities. For instance, 
Lee (2000) reports that full professors are much more likely than assistant and associate 
professors to disclose inventions and patent. 
Finally, we would also like to examine whether there are state-by-state differences in the 
determination of faculty salary adjustments at public universities. Such institutional controls 
should be explored, since they may serve as a proxy for the constraints that university 
administrators face when rewarding faculty for their commitment to technology licensing 
through the university. 
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Notes 
1. See Poyago-Theotoky et al. (2002) for an analysis of the policy implications of the growth of 
UITT. 
2. We did not examine such hotbeds of UITT as Cambridge, Massachusetts (MIT, Harvard) or 
California's Silicon Valley (Stanford, UC-Berkeley), since we wish to explore this phenomenon 
at more representative institutions. 
3. Detailed information on our qualitative methods is presented in Siegel et al. (2003). 
4. Inventors often use such funds to support graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and other 
laboratory costs. 
5. These figures include expenditures in support of prosecution, maintenance, litigation, and 
interference costs related to patents and/or copyrights (see AUTM, 1999). 
6. See Pressman et al. 1995). 
7. This is especially problematic for public universities. 
8. At some universities, there is a threshold effect, in the sense that inventors garner a very large 
share (e.g. 50%) at low levels of revenue (e.g. 50%), and then the share declines (e.g. 33%) as 
revenue exceeds a certain level. We thank Jonathan Silberman for providing us with these data. 
9. Other distributional assumptions for the inefficiency disturbance that have been invoked are 
truncated normal and exponential (see Sena, 1999). 
10. As discussed in Battese and Coelli (1995), this model can also incorporate panel data. 
11. Thursby and Kemp (1998) and Thursby and Thursby (2000) use DEA to assess the relative 
efficiency of UITT. 
12. The final sample contains 80 out of 89 Research One universities, or those that award 50 or 
more doctoral degrees and receive at least $40 million annually in federal research grants. 
13. Source: NSF-Research and Development in Industry (1991–1996), U.S. BEA (1999)-Gross 
State Product data reported in Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth. 
14. A similar problem is encountered with patents. Jaffe et al. (1993), Trajtenberg et al. (1997), 
and Henderson et al. (1998) weight patents on the basis of the number of citations they receive. 
15. Although there is no direct diagnostic test for multi-collinearity, we do not observe any of the 
key symptoms of this problem: (1) High R 2 but few significant t ratios; (2) High pairwise and 
partial correlations among explanatory variables (see Table 2). Thus, we conclude that there does 
not appear to be a multi-collinearity problem. 
16 That is, the average technical efficiency is closer to one when we include these variables in 
the stochastic frontier model (0.09/(1 − 0.78) = 0.409 and 0.10/(1 − 0.79) = 476). 
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